Europe after US Hegemony: player or playing field?
As I’ve explained before, the Americans have to depart Europe for Asia simply because holding the line on the central front will consume the entire strength of the United States. But there is a difference between a responsible exit and the present breakdown of transatlantic relations.
The reason the breakdown is simple. US hegemony has come to an abrupt end with the world policy of the Trump administration. By this I mean, hegemony sensu Triepel, as relayed by Schroeder. Basically, hegemony is agenda-setting by dominant states for a group of coordinate states who, despite great inequality in hard power, formally enjoy equal status as part of an international order (reproduced by rewards for inclusion and penalties for exclusion), and crucially, consent to this prerogative of the dominant states. Germany under Bismarck was a hegemon in this sense.
Schroeder contrasts hegemony with empire, where a dominant state attempts to simply impose its will on the weaker states. Bush’s war on Saddam was imperialist, as Schroeder argued, but the Bush administration did not fully break with US hegemony in Europe. Neither is a European empire, Greenland notwithstanding, being sought by the US under Trump. The administration has clearly come in with a kind of high-school realism and is pursuing a capricious world policy. It is the capriciousness of this world policy that signals the end of American interest in the hegemonic business sensu Triepel.
This is going to end in one of two ways. Either, the attempt with be abandoned. Or it will fail, leaving the US isolated behind a great wall. In either case, US hegemony cannot be revived. It has passed. The reason is that even if the administration or a future successor were to reverse course, Americans will not again be able to credibly promise not to revert to the wilful abandonment of hegemony. This means that all other states in the international order and beyond (ie, penalized outlaw states excluded from the order) must work on the assumption that whatever generated this capitulation is a structural feature of the US and could resurface at any time, for any length of time.
So, for purposes of building and sustaining the European order, Trump’s world policy constitutes a sudden death of American hegemony. In what follows, I will discuss what kind of possibilities are open to Europe so that Europeans can better determine their hopelessly collectively-entangled future, particularly as a security order.
Ukraine is a complete and total distraction from the task that awaits Europe. The war is over. And the terms of the peace will be decided by two men who are not in Europe. There is nothing Europe can do about that. The sooner heads turn to the longer term future the better for Europe.
There are basically two possible futures for Europe as a security order. First, it could become a playing field for bigger powers. Second, it can become a polar power in a multipolar world of continental powers and join the ranks of the US, China, Russia, and perhaps India. The question hanging over Europe is whether it will be a great power coordinate with the US and China. (I will discuss Russia later, and skip India altogether since it is not material to European security.)
The first is the default. Unless there is a revolution—political and institutional—in European affairs, Europe will end up as a playing field. A concert of European powers will not be in a military position to prevent Russian encroachment on the eastern flank. The issue is bigger than the Baltics and Hungary. Even after these are absorbed by Russia, that will not thereby stabilize the frontier. The concert of European states will face permanently insecure eastern flank simply because Russia will be stronger than the concert. There are other issues with the concert. Above all, the revival of security competition on the continent. And no, that problem cannot be solved by national nuclear proliferation, as I have explained on Twitter.
The second requires a political and intellectual revolution in Europe. It requires European states to pool their security permanently. I know this is challenging for European nations. After all, it is the ultimate signal of sovereignty; the final frontier, as it were. But that is precisely where Schroeder comes back in. The task for the Germans, the French and the British, is to rise to the occasion and set this agenda for the continent’s security arrangements. That is, they need to act in concert as hegemonic powers. Easier said than done, I know, but that’s the responsibility placed on the shoulders of their statesmen by history.
Institutionally, this means a single combined arms army and nuclear deterrent under unified command. It is my understanding that the institutional innovations required are easier than the intellectual and political ones. Certainly, there is plenty of military talent on the continent who can help you with the details.
The money is easier still. In talking about money, and defense industry, and not talking about the issues raised in this essay, British, French and German statesmen are failing Europe. This is the main chance. Everything else is a distraction. So, pay attention.
Thanks for this clear articulation. A few thoughts.
If the Germans signal seriousness and urgency by properly deposing the reign of the debt break, and the EU more generally signals seriousness by creating a liquid market of eurobonds, I think this would be a hopefully checkpoint. But its not at all clear the European elites are fully bought in or have fully woken up from the end of history yet. Do you have a sense of what other critical points there are that show a serious urgency towards integration and an understanding of the historical moment, at least in political and financial terms? They have a marvelous world-historical crisis right now, and I, too, am afraid they will squander it.
Regarding pooling european security. I'm very curious how the european rearmament will suffer from disputes over how to allocate the benefits of such "military keynesianism" between different nations. In the US this has been solved by distributing the benefits across geographies, but with differing national defense champions, I wonder how this dynamic would play out.
I don't know who said it but someone once said Europe should become a large Switzerland, as a model for its future. Armed and ready, pro-social, and largely non-interventionist outside its sphere -- and importantly, able to conserve its own proclivity for provinciality (Switzerland is a country of small towns, in a real sense). This strikes me as at least a potentially correct rough sketch of what one model of europe could be, but who knows if that's even close to correct!
Generally right on the money... except "absorbed by Russia" bit. This is off on so many levels. From Russia's POV, Europe is a hornets nest and Europeans may as well be aliens from outer space; Russia doesn’t want to "absorb" any part of it any more than you want to adopt a rabid porcupine. There are other means to eliminate threats or exploit things to one's benefit.