Iran is a Great Power
No special pleading
In 1904, European military observers in the Far East relayed that Japan had beaten the Russians. Henceforth, Japan would be recognized as a great power. All the great powers are recognized by their performance on the battlefield by McKay and Scott (1983).1
The classic model of an international system is the European Pentarchy in 1815-1890.1 Of the five powers, France emerged first, with the defeat of Spanish imperialism in 1648. Austria emerged second, with the destruction of Ottoman power in Europe during the 1690s, culminating in the conquest of Belgrade and the Peace of Carlowitz in 1699. Great Britain emerged third, beginning with the Dutch takeover of the English state in 1688, consolidated during the struggle against Louis XIV, culminating in the Peace of Utrecht in 1713. Russia emerged soon after in 1721, with Peter the Great’s decisive defeat of Sweden in the Great Northern War. Brandenburg-Prussia was the last to emerge with Frederick the Great’s military victories in the Seven Years’ War, culminating in the Peace of Hubertusburg of 1763 whereby the extant great powers recognized the Prussian conquest of Silesia.2
Policy Tensor, “The End of US Hegemony.” March 15, 2025.
The polarity of the international system is the number of great powers in the system. What does that mean exactly? What it means is that there are powers in the international system that can put a serious fight with the mightiest of powers.2 You identify them and then you count how many you have identified and that is the polarity of the international system.
In the tradition of European statecraft, a Great Power is not merely a strong state, but one capable of putting up a fight with the strongest of powers in the system in a high-intensity conventional war. It does not mean that it can win. But it must be able to sustain a real fight.
Specifically, the identities of the great powers that one counts to obtain polarity is a hypothesis about what is to be expected in a clash of arms. The ground truth is revealed on the battlefield. This is how this question of great powers has been understood not just by modern scholars but by statesmen acting in the entire history of the European balance of power since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.3
We argued a week into the war that the US was facing strategic defeat. This has now been confirmed by events. John J. Mearsheimer describes it as ‘a clear victory’ for Iran. Lawrence Freedman concedes that if the war were to end now, it would be a ‘defeat’ for the United States.
The surest sign that we’re looking at a strategic defeat for the US and a clear Iranian victory is that Iran holds the Hormuz weapon firmly in its hands. As Gideon Rachman writes in the FT, the United States simply does not have the military means to reopen Hormuz so that a negotiated agreement with Iran is the only realistic option.
In fact, western military planners are very pessimistic about the chances of reopening the strait by military means alone. The geography of the area and the technology available to Iran — including drones that can be operated many miles from the shoreline — mean that even naval escorts cannot guarantee the safety of commercial traffic.
That leaves a negotiated agreement with Iran as the most realistic option. But Iran is likely to demand a very high price. The Iranian regime has its eye on potentially game-changing future revenues — as well as a means of dispensing favours or punishments to countries all over the world.
Gideon Rachman, “Iran could emerge from the war stronger and more dangerous.” March 30, 2026.
It is not clear what, besides toppling the regime, would constitute a strategic victory for the US. What is clearer is what would constitute a strategic defeat.
Regardless the war aims of the aggressors, it is clear that control of Hormuz is the main objective of the war. If the United States cannot forcibly retake Hormuz, that would constitute an unambiguous strategic defeat for the United States and a clear victory for Iran.
It is important to understand that the reason that Iran can successfully weaponize this chokepoint is not a mere fact of geography or technology. It is because the US and Israel has been unable to militarily subdue Iran that it can attempt to impose effective military control over this chokepoint at all. And it is because Iran is winning the interdiction war that it is able to hold US bases, Israel and the GCC states at risk, and impose cumulating costs on the world economy and the United States.4
Iran also enjoys escalation dominance against the US.5 If the US escalates by attacking assets that are really valuable to Iran, such as water desalinization plants or oil infrastructure, Iran can retaliate in kind against the oil monarchies across the gulf, and thereby impose great costs on the world economy and the United States. Indeed, this was manifest when Trump was forced to walk back his ultimatum.
While Iranian strikes across the gulf have declined since the early days, they show no sign of dwindling to zero, which is the signal of winning the interdiction war we need to look for.6 There is no sign yet that the interdiction war is being won. To the contrary, our updated model of the interdiction war suggests that Iran will be able to sustain present rates of fire indefinitely.
The Iranian response also goes far beyond counter-value attacks to encompass surprisingly effective counterforce campaign.
