Brenner's response to “The Empirical Evidence for the Brenner Hypothesis”
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Michael Lind introduced me to Robert Brenner, who has kindly permitted me to publish his response to my post. His response follows. Anusar Farooqui takes me to task for arguing that the fall in the manufacturing profit rate took place mainly between the mid 1960s and early 1980s, by bringing forward the fundamental point that the buildup of overcapacity in manufacturing did not end then, in the 1980s, but has continued to heighten virtually into the present. That is of course what I said--viz. that the buildup overcapacity resulting from the continuing intensification of international competition in manufacturing has continued to intensify, with the virtual collapse of investment on a world scale as perhaps its most striking and significant consequence. But, as Farooqui quickly also concludes, formally contradicting what he just said, the ongoing intensification of international competition and resulting buildup of overcapacity did NOT actually lead to much, if any, further fall in the rate of profit in manufacturing after the early 1980s, which was my contention. Yet, finally, despite the leveling off--not further fall-- of the profit rate, there was nonetheless, a deep falloff of capital accumulation, as the overcapacity, intensified competition, and the expectation of the continuation of same profoundly discouraged new investment.
Brenner's response to “The Empirical Evidence for the Brenner Hypothesis”
Brenner's response to “The Empirical Evidence…
Brenner's response to “The Empirical Evidence for the Brenner Hypothesis”
Michael Lind introduced me to Robert Brenner, who has kindly permitted me to publish his response to my post. His response follows. Anusar Farooqui takes me to task for arguing that the fall in the manufacturing profit rate took place mainly between the mid 1960s and early 1980s, by bringing forward the fundamental point that the buildup of overcapacity in manufacturing did not end then, in the 1980s, but has continued to heighten virtually into the present. That is of course what I said--viz. that the buildup overcapacity resulting from the continuing intensification of international competition in manufacturing has continued to intensify, with the virtual collapse of investment on a world scale as perhaps its most striking and significant consequence. But, as Farooqui quickly also concludes, formally contradicting what he just said, the ongoing intensification of international competition and resulting buildup of overcapacity did NOT actually lead to much, if any, further fall in the rate of profit in manufacturing after the early 1980s, which was my contention. Yet, finally, despite the leveling off--not further fall-- of the profit rate, there was nonetheless, a deep falloff of capital accumulation, as the overcapacity, intensified competition, and the expectation of the continuation of same profoundly discouraged new investment.