Does Mohammad bin Salman want to be a Sultan or a Despot?
policytensor.substack.com
After the oil price revolution what emerged in the gulf was a distinct model of a ‘rentier state’ that Gause called the ‘Oil Monarchy’. The oil windfall meant that the state came to enjoy a radical autonomy from society. With more than half the population on the state payroll, 100 percent of Saudi citizens dependent on ‘cradle-to-grave’ welfare, and almost all Saudi businesses feeding directly or indirectly at the state's tits, the Al Saud came to exercise uncontested control over the country. The Wahhabi clerics seemed to enjoy a degree of autonomy but in reality they too were tamed. Power in Saudi Arabia rested firmly in the corporate body of the ruing family, with different factions or subbranches competing for influence in what was effectively a ‘ruling oligarchy’ à la Winters. Inside the corporate body of the family, the King was no more than a ‘first among equals’. American protection after the Islamic Revolution provided external security, letting the Al Saud concentrate on family politics, propagating salafism worldwide, patronizing clients like Pakistan, and playing the regional game.
Does Mohammad bin Salman want to be a Sultan or a Despot?
Does Mohammad bin Salman want to be a Sultan…
Does Mohammad bin Salman want to be a Sultan or a Despot?
After the oil price revolution what emerged in the gulf was a distinct model of a ‘rentier state’ that Gause called the ‘Oil Monarchy’. The oil windfall meant that the state came to enjoy a radical autonomy from society. With more than half the population on the state payroll, 100 percent of Saudi citizens dependent on ‘cradle-to-grave’ welfare, and almost all Saudi businesses feeding directly or indirectly at the state's tits, the Al Saud came to exercise uncontested control over the country. The Wahhabi clerics seemed to enjoy a degree of autonomy but in reality they too were tamed. Power in Saudi Arabia rested firmly in the corporate body of the ruing family, with different factions or subbranches competing for influence in what was effectively a ‘ruling oligarchy’ à la Winters. Inside the corporate body of the family, the King was no more than a ‘first among equals’. American protection after the Islamic Revolution provided external security, letting the Al Saud concentrate on family politics, propagating salafism worldwide, patronizing clients like Pakistan, and playing the regional game.