US is hardly playing it like a defender. We attempt pre-emptive regime change twice a year if not more. We are currently sponsoring a bona-fide large scale war in UA which looks comparable to the Iran-Iraq war in scale (total casualties incl wounded est > 1MM, a decade's worth of European heavy land weapons expended.) Simultaneously we are sponsoring a genocide unlike anything seen in the Mediterranean since the French in Algeria, and maybe even more sadistic. Openly sponsoring unreformed terrorists in Syria too. Boldly (albeit w/ farcial incompetence) attempting an overhaul of world trade patterns, for the purpose of extending the "exorbitant privilege" of the USD. Casually torpedoing European liberal-capitalist project, lest there be another more viable and attractive model of western civilization. Trying continually, but with less and less effect, to stop the Global South from having access to development and technology.
When the showdown comes over China, I think it's not an invasion (idiotic Tom Clancy fap), nor even a blockade - at least logical, but only if one assumes for convenience that PRC thinks it has a limited "time window". Why exactly? Each year they pull ahead more. No, if there were a showdown, and I do think it's at least a 50/50, then most likely I believe it would be a US-instigated civil war on the island. It is the US which has a limited window of time. However the Republican and Democratic administrations are all-in on Israel, and they won't be diverting limited resources to secondary objectives in Asia. The danger is if a nationalist third party is formed in the US.
Thorough, coherent article but I think that China's content to play the long game and build its strengths, strengthen deference, put out Eurasian brushfires all while the US deals with its banquet of consequences from economic management.
While the French don't get any humanitarian prizes for how they tried to hold onto Algeria, let's remember that Western powers (including the US Marines) went to the Barbary coast to secure themselves and their trade routes from piracy and Sharia justified slave raids.
As for genocide comparisons, a better one would be to the Turks against the Armenians, Assyrian and Greeks in their native lands as the Asian invaders were trying to secure their conquest from attempts at liberation from the natives.
Yes, some parts of the article seem to propound the position that China will act like European/Western hegemonic powers. I can only assume that the writer sees similar motives. But motivations are culturally based. So the writer seems to be assuming Chinese culture the same as Western culture. But China has long behaved differently. I would need a strong workup in this area to believe that the Taiwan issue will be resolved this way.
My position is not that China is seeking hegemony, or that it will go to war for it. My position is that they are committed to taking Taiwan one way or another. And that forces them to make the best of best of highly constrained military-strategic realities. It is just a fact that they will have the initiative. What I am saying is that this has very significant implications for when and how they go. And that in turn has implications for US defense strategy and foreign policy.
Given the ability of China to infiltrate Taiwan leadership, one can esily assume that some decapitation actions could be taken with Kuomintang serving as political fifth column.
Given the huge size differential it's a bit odd that China hasn't already invaded Taiwan. Perhaps they're not as bellicose as we think they must be. They don't really have much form when it comes to invading other countries (not none, but not much and certainly very little compared to the West and Japan). Maybe we're projecting our own tendencies onto them. Pxx may be right that we'll trigger it rather than them initiating it.
There are several misapprehensions in your article so that the argument in total is wrong. First, you write "The CCP’s long-term military modernization efforts are geared towards reaching a specific peak of preparedness for the Taiwan scenario", but that is pure projection on your part that does not hold up to scrutiny. You can read the goals for the military modernization yourself; they have nothing to do with a Taiwan scenario. The 2027 goal is an intermediate goal focused on things like "Informatization" (i.e. getting the force ready to use modern tech), the 2035 goal is about reaching the cutting edge in mil-tech and the 2049 goal is about "becoming a world class military" (i.e. matching or surpassing the US military in all domains). You don’t even have to take their word for it, the actually observed military modernization right now is not geared towards a Taiwan invasion scenario. Here are some examples to prove this point:
-The infantry being giving the short stick in terms of funding (look how they cheaped out on the new service rifle and the new NVGs for example) and institutional reforms compared to all other branches. Not something you do if you actually intend to use them in the next decade.
-Massive investments in getting the ability to build 2 aircraft carriers simultaneously, despite their limited usefulness in an invasion scenario.
-Fighter jet procurement being focused on air supremacy instead of a strike role.
There are other examples, but in summary, actually observed military modernization is about fighting the US in the west pacific, not about invading Taiwan.
Second, the argument why both sides in WW1 and the axis in WW2 wanted to be first mover in a war by starting it do not apply to China. The fear of being cut off from natural resources is not as relevant in the postcolonial era, but even if it were, we know how China wants to reduce its resource import dependencies: through technology (EVs, batteries, methanol, ammonia for oil and gas; GMOs, Lab meat and plant-based alternatives for food). The more important reason for both world wars was the fear of not being able to keep up with the enemy’s military industry once it ramps up; that is absolutely not relevant for China now. Just look at the numbers right now: As a percentage of their respective GDP China spends a third of the US on military procurement, but surpasses the US in every weapon category which we can estimate (fighters, bombers, drones, AEW&Cs, Tankers, Transport, Surface combatants, SSNs, SSBNs, SSKs, Aircraft carriers, SAMs, MRLS). With such a huge disparity in relative investment there is no chance that China will ever struggle to keep up with the US+Allies, even if it has 0% GDP growth for the next 30 years.
It is only in the US’s interest to start a war as soon as possible, that’s why the 2027 invasion date was invented by China hawks in Washington: to manufacture consent for a “preventive” war with China.
"The more important reason for both world wars was the fear of not being able to keep up with the enemy’s military industry once it ramps up; that is absolutely not relevant for China now. Just look at the numbers right now . . ."
Not too mention that the strategic depth of China is insured by Russia, Mongolia, Central Asia, and Iran... Pakistan will have to shoose a side and India will be neutral.
The unification of China has been a persistent, recurring theme throughout her long, long history. The digestion of Hong Kong remains ongoing, and so far has proven to be more draconian than anyone would have wanted. Except as a platform for offensive weapons, Taiwan is not a particular threat. Defensive preparedness on Taiwan is somewhat lackadaisical, nevertheless invading the island successfully would be difficult. And why bother with all the destruction? Continued development on the mainland will make closer relations more attractive, and more natural. By comparison, Western neoliberal capitalism is looking shakier and shakier.
If the US has a grand strategy vis a vis China, Lord knows what it is.
I see the logic, but China can also afford to wait. Why roll the dice on military engagement when slow absorption is also an available strategy? Even in military terms, doesn’t more time also simply play to China’s advantage?
And the way the US is behaving these days (erratic is a charitable characterization) who’s to say it isn’t itself the “revisionist power”?
"The great question for US China policy is whether it is worth it. Is this a hill we want to die on? Should we not in fact secure a modus vivendi with China well before this nightmare scenario arrives? The Anglo-Saxon powers refused to accommodate Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union. Was it worth it? And those were smaller powers relative to the US. China is bigger and about to get much bigger still."
The US has absolutely no strategic depth in Asia against China. The closest truly friendly is Australia, but there, China is buffered by Indonesia and Phillipines. The Pacific Ocean is the biggest moat out there. Plus, the homefront is hollowed out. If Russia outproduces the entire NATO 3 times over, imagine what can China do?
The greedy minds of US ruling oligarchy would need to be excised first before US giving up on parasitising the entire world. The other problem is that while the brain and apetites have surged in the US, the body has attrophied. Same for most of its allies. S Korea and Japan are not interested. Israel, in Western Asia is too puny and not trusting any vassalized states and not trusted by any arround. And it failed resoundly with Iran and got slapped such that it had to cry uncle.
The only appeal the US has is for compradror elites, but are fewer and fewer of those and only in smaller countries.
US is hardly playing it like a defender. We attempt pre-emptive regime change twice a year if not more. We are currently sponsoring a bona-fide large scale war in UA which looks comparable to the Iran-Iraq war in scale (total casualties incl wounded est > 1MM, a decade's worth of European heavy land weapons expended.) Simultaneously we are sponsoring a genocide unlike anything seen in the Mediterranean since the French in Algeria, and maybe even more sadistic. Openly sponsoring unreformed terrorists in Syria too. Boldly (albeit w/ farcial incompetence) attempting an overhaul of world trade patterns, for the purpose of extending the "exorbitant privilege" of the USD. Casually torpedoing European liberal-capitalist project, lest there be another more viable and attractive model of western civilization. Trying continually, but with less and less effect, to stop the Global South from having access to development and technology.
When the showdown comes over China, I think it's not an invasion (idiotic Tom Clancy fap), nor even a blockade - at least logical, but only if one assumes for convenience that PRC thinks it has a limited "time window". Why exactly? Each year they pull ahead more. No, if there were a showdown, and I do think it's at least a 50/50, then most likely I believe it would be a US-instigated civil war on the island. It is the US which has a limited window of time. However the Republican and Democratic administrations are all-in on Israel, and they won't be diverting limited resources to secondary objectives in Asia. The danger is if a nationalist third party is formed in the US.
Thorough, coherent article but I think that China's content to play the long game and build its strengths, strengthen deference, put out Eurasian brushfires all while the US deals with its banquet of consequences from economic management.
While the French don't get any humanitarian prizes for how they tried to hold onto Algeria, let's remember that Western powers (including the US Marines) went to the Barbary coast to secure themselves and their trade routes from piracy and Sharia justified slave raids.
As for genocide comparisons, a better one would be to the Turks against the Armenians, Assyrian and Greeks in their native lands as the Asian invaders were trying to secure their conquest from attempts at liberation from the natives.
Yes, some parts of the article seem to propound the position that China will act like European/Western hegemonic powers. I can only assume that the writer sees similar motives. But motivations are culturally based. So the writer seems to be assuming Chinese culture the same as Western culture. But China has long behaved differently. I would need a strong workup in this area to believe that the Taiwan issue will be resolved this way.
My position is not that China is seeking hegemony, or that it will go to war for it. My position is that they are committed to taking Taiwan one way or another. And that forces them to make the best of best of highly constrained military-strategic realities. It is just a fact that they will have the initiative. What I am saying is that this has very significant implications for when and how they go. And that in turn has implications for US defense strategy and foreign policy.
But are you not assuming a military operation as the method?
Given the ability of China to infiltrate Taiwan leadership, one can esily assume that some decapitation actions could be taken with Kuomintang serving as political fifth column.
Given the huge size differential it's a bit odd that China hasn't already invaded Taiwan. Perhaps they're not as bellicose as we think they must be. They don't really have much form when it comes to invading other countries (not none, but not much and certainly very little compared to the West and Japan). Maybe we're projecting our own tendencies onto them. Pxx may be right that we'll trigger it rather than them initiating it.
Indeed, and “we” triggering it would be proof of our stupidity. So I guess it’s inevitable.
There are several misapprehensions in your article so that the argument in total is wrong. First, you write "The CCP’s long-term military modernization efforts are geared towards reaching a specific peak of preparedness for the Taiwan scenario", but that is pure projection on your part that does not hold up to scrutiny. You can read the goals for the military modernization yourself; they have nothing to do with a Taiwan scenario. The 2027 goal is an intermediate goal focused on things like "Informatization" (i.e. getting the force ready to use modern tech), the 2035 goal is about reaching the cutting edge in mil-tech and the 2049 goal is about "becoming a world class military" (i.e. matching or surpassing the US military in all domains). You don’t even have to take their word for it, the actually observed military modernization right now is not geared towards a Taiwan invasion scenario. Here are some examples to prove this point:
-The infantry being giving the short stick in terms of funding (look how they cheaped out on the new service rifle and the new NVGs for example) and institutional reforms compared to all other branches. Not something you do if you actually intend to use them in the next decade.
-Massive investments in getting the ability to build 2 aircraft carriers simultaneously, despite their limited usefulness in an invasion scenario.
-Fighter jet procurement being focused on air supremacy instead of a strike role.
There are other examples, but in summary, actually observed military modernization is about fighting the US in the west pacific, not about invading Taiwan.
Second, the argument why both sides in WW1 and the axis in WW2 wanted to be first mover in a war by starting it do not apply to China. The fear of being cut off from natural resources is not as relevant in the postcolonial era, but even if it were, we know how China wants to reduce its resource import dependencies: through technology (EVs, batteries, methanol, ammonia for oil and gas; GMOs, Lab meat and plant-based alternatives for food). The more important reason for both world wars was the fear of not being able to keep up with the enemy’s military industry once it ramps up; that is absolutely not relevant for China now. Just look at the numbers right now: As a percentage of their respective GDP China spends a third of the US on military procurement, but surpasses the US in every weapon category which we can estimate (fighters, bombers, drones, AEW&Cs, Tankers, Transport, Surface combatants, SSNs, SSBNs, SSKs, Aircraft carriers, SAMs, MRLS). With such a huge disparity in relative investment there is no chance that China will ever struggle to keep up with the US+Allies, even if it has 0% GDP growth for the next 30 years.
It is only in the US’s interest to start a war as soon as possible, that’s why the 2027 invasion date was invented by China hawks in Washington: to manufacture consent for a “preventive” war with China.
"The more important reason for both world wars was the fear of not being able to keep up with the enemy’s military industry once it ramps up; that is absolutely not relevant for China now. Just look at the numbers right now . . ."
Essential point right there
Not too mention that the strategic depth of China is insured by Russia, Mongolia, Central Asia, and Iran... Pakistan will have to shoose a side and India will be neutral.
The unification of China has been a persistent, recurring theme throughout her long, long history. The digestion of Hong Kong remains ongoing, and so far has proven to be more draconian than anyone would have wanted. Except as a platform for offensive weapons, Taiwan is not a particular threat. Defensive preparedness on Taiwan is somewhat lackadaisical, nevertheless invading the island successfully would be difficult. And why bother with all the destruction? Continued development on the mainland will make closer relations more attractive, and more natural. By comparison, Western neoliberal capitalism is looking shakier and shakier.
If the US has a grand strategy vis a vis China, Lord knows what it is.
I see the logic, but China can also afford to wait. Why roll the dice on military engagement when slow absorption is also an available strategy? Even in military terms, doesn’t more time also simply play to China’s advantage?
And the way the US is behaving these days (erratic is a charitable characterization) who’s to say it isn’t itself the “revisionist power”?
"The great question for US China policy is whether it is worth it. Is this a hill we want to die on? Should we not in fact secure a modus vivendi with China well before this nightmare scenario arrives? The Anglo-Saxon powers refused to accommodate Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union. Was it worth it? And those were smaller powers relative to the US. China is bigger and about to get much bigger still."
The US has absolutely no strategic depth in Asia against China. The closest truly friendly is Australia, but there, China is buffered by Indonesia and Phillipines. The Pacific Ocean is the biggest moat out there. Plus, the homefront is hollowed out. If Russia outproduces the entire NATO 3 times over, imagine what can China do?
The greedy minds of US ruling oligarchy would need to be excised first before US giving up on parasitising the entire world. The other problem is that while the brain and apetites have surged in the US, the body has attrophied. Same for most of its allies. S Korea and Japan are not interested. Israel, in Western Asia is too puny and not trusting any vassalized states and not trusted by any arround. And it failed resoundly with Iran and got slapped such that it had to cry uncle.
The only appeal the US has is for compradror elites, but are fewer and fewer of those and only in smaller countries.