In early summer, I wrote about how the Syrian regime is a hard nut to crack in The Syria Conundrum. I essentially agreed with the reasoning of the New York Times: “Mr. Assad oversees a security state in which his minority Alawi sect fears that if his family is ousted, it will face annihilation at the hands of the Sunni majority. That has kept the government remarkably cohesive, cut down on military defections and left Mr. Assad in a less vulnerable position…” Moreover, I argued that the dominant strata of Syrian society – the affluent class dominated by Alawi and the Sunni business community – has coalesced around the Assad regime as the conflict has taken on increasingly sectarian overtones and raised the specter of chaos. Furthermore, since the regime had firm control over the entire coercive apparatus and a monopoly on heavy weapons, the opposition cannot possibly wrestle power away from it without external support even if it were united and cohesive.
The Syria Conundrum Reconsidered
The Syria Conundrum Reconsidered
The Syria Conundrum Reconsidered
In early summer, I wrote about how the Syrian regime is a hard nut to crack in The Syria Conundrum. I essentially agreed with the reasoning of the New York Times: “Mr. Assad oversees a security state in which his minority Alawi sect fears that if his family is ousted, it will face annihilation at the hands of the Sunni majority. That has kept the government remarkably cohesive, cut down on military defections and left Mr. Assad in a less vulnerable position…” Moreover, I argued that the dominant strata of Syrian society – the affluent class dominated by Alawi and the Sunni business community – has coalesced around the Assad regime as the conflict has taken on increasingly sectarian overtones and raised the specter of chaos. Furthermore, since the regime had firm control over the entire coercive apparatus and a monopoly on heavy weapons, the opposition cannot possibly wrestle power away from it without external support even if it were united and cohesive.